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Drawing on recently declassified records, this article explores the relationship
between the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the U.S. Office
of Strategic Services (OSS)—the wartime intelligence agencies responsible for
espionage, subversion, and other covert activities—in the Italian campaign
during World War II.1
Until recently, the extensive Anglo-American literature on OSS-SOE rela-
tions focused mainly on the two agencies’ wartime activities in the Balkans and
France. The Italian theater received relatively little attention.2 The reasons for
1. The official history of SOE in Italy was published in David Stafford, Mission Accomplished (London:
Bodley Head, 2011). In English, see also Christopher Woods, “SOE in Italy,” in Mark Seaman, ed.,
Special Operations Executive: A New Instrument of War (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 91–102; Charles
Delzell, “The American OSS and the Italian Armed Resistance,” in Renzo Amedeo, ed., Le missioni
alleate e le formazioni dei partigiani autonomi nella Resistenza piemontese (Cuneo, Italy: L’Arciere,
1980), pp. 353–375; and Julie Le Gac, “From Suspicious Observation to Ambiguous Collaboration:
The Allies and Italian Partisans, 1943–1944,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. XXXI, No. 5 (October
2008), pp. 721–742. The most important scholarly accounts in Italian are Elena Aga Rossi, “Alleati e
resistenza in Italia,” in Elena Aga Rossi, L’Italia nella sconfitta: Politica interna e situazione internazionale
durante la seconda guerra mondiale (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1985), pp. 191–230; and
Massimo de Leonardis, La Gran Bretagna e la resistenza partigiana in Italia: 1943–1945 (Naples:
Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1988). Recently published and based on the newly declassified OSS and
SOE records are Mireno Berrettini, La Gran Bretagna e l’antifascismo italiano: Diplomazia clandestina,
intelligence, operazioni speciali (Rome: Le Lettere, 2010); and Tommaso Piffer, Gli Alleati e la Resistenza
italiana (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2010), which contains a complete bibliography. In 1990 and 1995, SOE
and OSS veterans met in Bologna and Venice respectively. The proceedings have been published in
FIAP—Special Forces Club, No. 1 Special Force nella Resistenza italiana, 2 vols. (Bologna: Clueb, 1990);
and Gli Americani e la guerra di liberazione in Italia: Office of Strategic Services (OSS) e la Resistenza
italiana (Rome: Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Dipartimento per l’Informazione e l’Editoria,
1995).
2. On the Mediterranean theater, see esp. Jay Jakub, Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration
and Rivalry in Human Intelligence Collection and Special Operations, 1940–45 (London: Macmillan,
1999); and M. R. D. Foot, “The OSS and SOE: An Equal Partnership?” in George Chalou, ed.,
The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II (Washington, DC: National Archives
and Records Administration, 2002), pp. 295–300. Other regional studies include, among the others,
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this lack of attention are straightforward. First, the Italian campaign has usually
been regarded as a “sideshow” in the history of the war. Second, OSS and SOE
policies in Italy had fewer dramatic results than in Yugoslavia and Greece and
thus rarely have drawn the attention of historians. Usually written under the
shadow of the Cold War confrontation, the few studies that have tangentially
dealt with this topic have tended to downplay the U.S.-British competition
and have focused instead on defending the two agencies from the accusation
that their policies toward the resistance were politically driven.3 Conversely,
general histories of the Italian resistance movement, mostly by Italian scholars,
have tended to emphasize a strong difference between a supposedly progres-
sive U.S. policy and a conservative British outlook. These studies, however,
have failed to assess how the two spy agencies’ relationship affected the actual
support given to the partisans.4
This article shows that OSS and SOE operations in Italy went well beyond
regional interests. A survey of these operations not only presents a noteworthy
case study of the difficulties of wartime cooperation, but also sheds light on a
key turning point in relations between the two agencies.
Italy was the venue in which the OSS was finally able to overcome its
dependence on SOE and establish itself as an independent agency. Although
SOE maintained its supremacy in the Balkans and OSS agreed to a good level
of integration with its British counterpart in France, the situation was very dif-
ferent in Italy, where the OSS not only imposed the complete separation of the
two agencies but also, by the end of the campaign, overtook the British in the
number of missions and supplies sent to the partisan groups in the field. This
reversal of the two agencies’ roles was a significant indicator of the “changing
of the guard” in the clandestine world and had important implications for the
effectiveness of the support given to the resistance movements as well as on
the global activities of the OSS and SOE.
Roderick Bailey, “OSS-SOE Relations, Albania 1943–44,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol.
XV, No. 2 (2000), pp. 20–35; Tom C. Wales, “The ‘Massingham’ Mission and the Secret ‘Special
Relationship’,” and Matthew Jones, ‘Kipling and all that’. American Perceptions of SOE and British
Imperial Intrigue in the Balkans, 1943–1945,” both in Neville Wylie, ed., The Politics and Strategy
of Clandestine War: Special Operations Executive, 1940–1946 (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 42–65
and pp. 90–108, respectively. Allied intelligence relations in the Pacific theater are analyzed in Richard
J. Aldrich, Intelligence and the War against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Services
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
3. See, for example, Frederick William Deakin, “Lo Special Operations Executive e la lotta partigiana,”
in Francesca Ferratini Tosi, Gaetano Grassi, and Massimo Legnani, eds., L’Italia nella seconda guerra
mondiale e nella Resistenza (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1988), pp. 93–107.
4. The standard account taking this approach is Pietro Secchia and Filippo Frassati, La Resistenza e gli
alleati (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1962).
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The Evolution of OSS-SOE Relations
OSS and SOE were created at different times but with the common task of
supporting the anti-German guerrilla movements, which they hoped would
spread in Nazi-occupied Europe. First to take shape was SOE, created by the
British in the summer of 1940 shortly after the fall of France.5 OSS, which
also included branches for political intelligence and propaganda operations,
was set up two years later.6
The formal starting point of the relationship between SOE and OSS
was an agreement signed in June 1942 that established geographic spheres
of responsibility for each agency. SOE was granted responsibility for most of
Europe, including the Balkans. In Germany and Italy the two organizations
claimed the right to act independently. OSS took primary responsibility for
China, the Pacific, and North Africa.7
The agreement reflected the strengths of the two organizations when it
was signed. At that time, SOE already had two years of experience with the
European resistance groups and had made contact with the most important of
them from Poland to Greece, albeit with mixed results. SOE and the Foreign
Office were deeply engaged in balancing the political and military problems
posed by the existence of guerrilla groups, which often had postwar aims at
odds with those of the British. By contrast, OSS was very much the newcomer.
During the first few months of its existence, it relied heavily on the British for
training, materials, and operational guidance. The primacy granted to SOE
in the Balkans also reflected U.S. recognition that the area was traditionally
linked with British interests, which at that moment the United States did not
feel strong enough to challenge or even question. Conversely, the British were
prepared to let OSS run almost all intelligence operations in preparation for
the landing in North Africa, which was due to start in November 1942. At the
root of that decision was friction between the French and the British in the
5. As a starting point on SOE, see William Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE (London: St Ermin’s
Press, 2000); David Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, 1940–1945: A Survey of the Special
Operations Executive, with Documents (London: Macmillan, 1980), and two recent collections of
papers related to different theaters and interpretative problems: Wylie, ed., The Politics and Strategy of
Clandestine War; and Seaman, ed., Special Operations Executive.
6. George Chalou, ed., The Secrets War; Bradley Smith, The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the
CIA (London: Andre´ Deutsch, 1983); Richard Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First
Central Intelligence Agency, 2nd ed. (Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2005); and the two-volume official
history: War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) (New York: Walker, 1976); and The Overseas
Targets: War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) (New York: Walker, 1976).
7. Jakub, Spies and Saboteurs, pp. 49–53; Smith, The Shadow Warriors, pp. 168–176; and Mackenzie,
The Secret History of SOE, pp. 391–393.
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region and a British desire to assist the OSS director, William J. (“Wild Bill”)
Donovan, in establishing and proving his new agency.8
Paralleling the mutual distrust and suspicion that often characterized the
Anglo-American alliance at every level, the relationship betweenOSS and SOE
in the Mediterranean was never an easy one.9 The obvious Anglo-American
rivalry resulted in British efforts to keep OSS under its control whenever
possible, and in U.S. attempts to expand OSS’s area of influence over its
counterpart.
At the beginning of 1943, Donovan, anxious to build on OSS success
in North Africa, began questioning SOE supremacy in the Balkans. The re-
sult, as Matthew Jones writes, was “an increasing determination to establish
an independent OSS set-up and approach in the region sometimes at odds
with official British policy toward the local forces of resistance.”10 Donovan
established an independent OSS base in Cairo and obtained the right to send
OSS personnel to the Balkans. The first U.S. missions were dispatched in
August. The British, however, maintained control over communications and
codes. A few months later, when the British switched their support in Yu-
goslavia from General Drazˇa Mihailovic´, commander of the Royalist Chetnik
guerrillas, to Josip Broz Tito, head of the Communist partisan movement,
Donovan and his men sought to alter that policy. The Balkans became the
forum for the one of the strongest policy disagreements between OSS and
SOE during the war. As Jay Jakub writes in his study of the OSS-SOE rela-
tionship in the Mediterranean, “the Yugoslav morass and British actions there
and in Cairo during 1942–4 removed any vestige of naivety within OSS about
the nature of special warfare and of the organization’s relationship with the
British.”11
Despite Donovan’s intentions, the British preserved their leading role in
the Balkans, both formally and de facto. A fewmonths later, the opening of the
Italian campaign provided the OSS with a new opportunity to try to overturn
the balance of power with the British.
8. Tom C. Wales, “The ‘Massingham’ Mission and the Secret ‘Special Relationship,’” p. 43.
9. The idea of a “special relationship” between the United States and Great Britain, as touted by
Winston Churchill in his memoirs, has been challenged since the late 1970s. For a general and early
overview of the problem, see David Reynolds, “Roosevelt, Churchill and theWartime Anglo-American
Alliance, 1939–1945: Towards a New Synthesis,” in William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, eds., The
“Special Relationship”: Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (Oxford, UK: The Clarendon Press, 1986),
pp. 17–41, reprinted in David Reynolds, From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the
International History of the 1940s (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 49–71.
10. Jones, “‘Kipling and All That,’” p. 91.
11. Jakub, Spies and Saboteurs, p. 143.
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OSS and SOE in Italy
During the Italian campaign, the United States and Britain had extensive re-
lations with the Italian partisan movement and provided the guerrillas with
crucial support via OSS and SOE. The agencies trained the partisans, col-
lected useful information, and relied on them when necessary to maintain
order after the German occupation collapsed. The Allies shipped more than
6,000 tons of materiel to the Italian partisans during the war.12 After an
agreement was signed between the Supreme Allied Command in the Mediter-
ranean Theater (SACMED) and the Italian Committee of National Liberation
(CLNAI) in December 1944, the Allies made financial contributions that were
of paramount importance to the survival of the Italian political body.13
Although OSS and SOE had contacts with the Italian antifascist move-
ment before the start of the campaign, the two agencies did not become fully
engaged in the theater until after the armistice and the occupation of northern
Italy by the Germans.14
After September 1943, when the Allied armies advanced from southern
Italy and the first guerrilla groups arose in northern Italy, both OSS and
SOE established bases in the south. British special operations in Italy were
concentrated under SOE base “Maryland” at Bari, with RoyalNavy Lieutenant
Commander Gerald Holdsworth in charge. The base was to be under the
supervision of the 15th Army Group (later renamed the Allied Armies in Italy,
AAI) and its political adviser HaroldMacmillan. A regional section in London,
directed by Lieutenant Colonel Cecil Roseberry, was responsible for liaising
with the British representatives in Switzerland. SOE units that operated in Italy
were called the No. 1 Special Force.15 As for OSS, all sections were nominally
put under Company D of the 2677th Regiment (Prov.), based first in North
Africa and later in Caserta.16
The first attempt to coordinate the work of the two agencies was made
in February 1944, when Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) created a special
section (G-3 Special Operations) to “interpret and co-ordinate the policy and
12. “AFHQ History of Special Operation: Mediterranean Theater: 1942–1945,” Section XVI, Annex
A, in The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNAUK), HS 7/170.
13. On this agreement, see Stafford, Mission Accomplished, pp. 255–258.
14. For an overview of SOE’s activity before 1943, see Roderick Bailey, Target: Italy: The Secret War
against Mussolini, 1940–1943 (London: Faber & Faber, 2014).
15. Stafford, Mission Accomplished, pp. 76–70;Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE, p. 547; and “SOE
History of J Section,” in TNAUK, HS 7/58, p. 19.
16. The Overseas Targets, pp. 85–91.
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requirements” of the two agencies and other organizations involved in sup-
porting the guerrilla movement. U.S. Brigadier General Benjamin Caffey was
appointed head of this organization. According to the “SOEHistory of SOM”
compiled by the British, “the appointment of an American officer with no ex-
perience of secret work [was] due to the need to maintain an Anglo/American
balance at AFHQ.”17 In April, AFHQ established a coordinating body for all
Special Operations in the Mediterranean (SOM), with British Major General
W. A. Stawell in charge, but OSS refused to assign any officers there because
it regarded the new body as a backhanded British infringement on OSS’s
independence.18
SOM’s position remained unclear. On the one hand, it fell under the
direction of AFHQ only through the mediation of the G-3 (Army Special
Operations section). On the other hand, it had no direct control over the
lower echelons, “which looked for operational directives to various other com-
manders and were on the administrative side very well accustomed to look
after themselves.”19 The result was quite confusing, and as the official history
of SOE concludes: “it is to be hoped in the interest of posterity that no similar
set-up will ever again recur, since it may be said with confidence that the set-up
which existed in 1944 in the [Mediterranean Theater of Operations] involved
problems of remote control which in any future war should be guarded against
with every care.”20
Proposals for a more efficient organization were frustrated by three factors:
the strong anti-British feelings that were widespread in the OSS Italian section
and the corresponding desire for independence; the peculiar balance of power
17. “SOE History of SOM,” in TNAUK, HS 7/61, p. 7. This attempt intersected with the overall
reorganization of AFHQ, as agreed during the Cairo conference in December 1943. On that occasion,
the Allies had agreed to unify AFHQandGHQMiddle East under a single SupremeAlliedCommander
Mediterranean (SACMED). U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who up to that point had been
responsible for AFHQ, was put in charge of the landing in France, and British General Henry
Maitland Wilson took his place. However, land operations in Italy were still to be conducted by AAI
from a separate headquarters under General Harold Alexander’s command, as already established at the
Casablanca conference. Matthew Jones, Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942–44
(London: MacMillan Press, 1996), pp. 97–137.
18. On this organization, see Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE, p. 406; “SOE History of SOM”;
and Jones, “‘Kipling and All That,’” p. 93.
19. Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE, p. 406.
20. “SOE History of SOM.” See also F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its
Influence on Strategy and Operations, Vol. 3, Part 1 (London: HMSO, 1984), p. 463. Both the No. 1
Special Force and the OSS units were under the control of HQ AAI, which was formally responsible
for partisan warfare in Italy, but the former was directly dependent on London and SOM, whereas the
latter was dependent on the 2677th Regiment (Prov.). In turn, SOM and the 2677th Regiment (Prov.)
were part of AFHQ, but there was no direct link between them, and they formulated their policies
independently. Moreover, no joint committee or coordinating body was created at AAI level.
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inside the Mediterranean chain of command, which prevented AFHQ from
imposing its will on the subordinate structures; and the commonly shared
perception at the time that a strong, widespread resistance movement would
likely never emerge in occupied Italy. In subsequent months the relationship
between OSS and SOE in Italy was dictated mainly by the development of
these factors.
The first factor relates to the general attitude of theU.S. teams, which were
unwilling to cooperate with their counterparts while preparing for the invasion
from their bases in North Africa and were growing increasingly intolerant of
British patronage.21 In addition, most of the agents dispatched to Italy by OSS
were Italian-Americans, fiercely Anglophobic, and deeply suspicious of British
intentions in Italy.22
U.S. suspicions, the search for independence, and a determination not
to become entangled in alleged British maneuvers resulted in OSS’s refusal to
participate in all coordinating bodies proposed by SOEorAFHQ.U.S. officials
refused to accept an arrangement between the two organizations resembling
the one in North Africa or in the Balkans. Indeed, they refused any setup at all.
Donovan directly backed this approach because he believed that in the Italian
campaign “both organizations would be starting more or less from scratch”
and OSS could prove its value as an independent organization.23 This decision
was the result of a clear calculation of forces. At the same time, Donovan
pushed OSS to collaborate with SOE in France. For several reasons related to
the difficult U.S. relationship with General Charles de Gaulle and the already
strong network built in France by the British, OSS could not hope to act
independently there, as Donovan was well aware. In France, this approach,
coupled with the presence of U.S. officers more sympathetic to the British,
resulted in the almost complete merger of the two organizations under the
Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ) in London, in one of the most successful
cases of cooperation between the two agencies.24
The second factor was the inability of AFHQ to impose its will on the
lower echelon of commanders. This was a direct result of the presence of a
21. See Corvo to Brennan, 12 June 1943, in U.S. National Archives and Record Administration
(NARA), Record Group (RG) 226, Entry 92 A, Box 19, Folder 280.
22. See, for example, the numerous passages devoted to the British in the diary of Max Corvo, a chief
of the SI branch. Max Corvo, The OSS in Italy, 1942–1945: A Personal Memoir (New York: Praeger,
1990).
23. Woods, “SOE in Italy,” p. 100. The impact of Donovan’s decision is also stressed in Stafford,
Mission Accomplished, p. 32.
24. See Jakub, Spies and Saboteurs, pp. 146–184; and Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in
War-Time London: The Story of OSS (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 70–91.
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double tier of command (AFHQ and the AAI) and of hostility inside AFHQ
not just between the two sides but among the different levels of commanders
regardless of their nationality. Each section tended to look for guidance at the
more sympathetic level of the chain of command: the British at the SOM, and
U.S. officials at the G-3 section of the AAI, which consisted predominantly of
U.S. citizens and seemed to be much less interested in facilitating coordination
between the two agencies.25 AFHQ’s attempt to establish the SOM as a central
agency proved unsuccessful, as did Wilson’s attempt to establish direct control
over the military activities of the AAI.
The third factor was that neither Britain nor the United States had ex-
pected a strong resistance movement to emerge in Italy because Italians had
generally shown little inclination to engage in armed resistance.Months passed
before the Allies could formulate a clear picture of the situation and decide
whether the movement was worthy of support. InOctober 1943, summarizing
a widespread view among British andU.S. officials, Cecil Roseberry stated, “we
are doubtful of probable fighting value of these groups . . .We cannot afford
to waste stores and aircraft effort on hypothetical bonuses.”26 Consequently,
at that point the problem of organization and coordination was not consid-
ered a priority, and AFHQ did not want to push too far an already difficult
situation.27
However, even at the beginning of 1945, when the now much stronger
Italian resistance movement was called on to play an important role in the
last phase of the campaign, OSS refused to assent to any plan involving
coordination with the British. In January 1945 the AFHQ proposed to create
an integrated OSS/SO and SOE control headquarters, but because of intra-
Allied friction the AFHQ attempt failed.28 As Colonel Gerald King (G-3
chief of staff ) stated, OSS considered any form of coordination an anathema
25. See also “SOE Activity in Italy,” ch. 9, in TNAUK, HS 7/58.
26. Cipher telegram toMassingham, No. 818, 16 October 1943, in TNAUK, HS 6/781; and Stafford,
Mission Accomplished, p. 114.
27. The same was true concerning the procedures for allocating supplies. Doris Condit, Allied Supplies
for Italian Partisans during World War II (Washington, DC:Operations ResearchOffice, JohnsHopkins
University, 1954), p. 10. Again, the comparison with what happened in London is instructive. The
merger of SOE and OSS in the SFHQ was a direct result, among other things, of Eisenhower’s
intervention because he regarded the resistance as a fundamental part of his efforts. MacPherson,
American Intelligence in War-Time London, p. 82.
28. “OSS/SO and SOE Activities in Support of Italian Resistance,” 14 January 1945, in TNAUK,
WO 204/11593. As happened at the beginning of 1944, on this occasion the coordination attempt
was linked with a general reorganization of the commands. In December 1944, General Wilson moved
to Washington to head the Joint Staff Mission, and Alexander was nominated SACMED for AFHQ.
AAI was again renamed 15th Army Group, and Clark was put in charge of it. Jones, Britain, the United
States and the Mediterranean War, pp. 211–215.
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“both in word and fact” and tried to eschew it.29 As early as December 1943,
OSS officials had feared a British attempt “to switch [the] overall direction
of partisan matters from AAI to AFHQ, i.e., from the American Clark to
British Alexander,” and Donovan had immediately alerted General George C.
Marshall about this possibility.30
OSS formed a special committee to analyze the AFHQproposal and ended
up rejecting it on jurisdictional, administrative, and operational grounds.
The committee noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sought to maintain
total independence of Secret Intelligence (SI) activities and that most Special
Operations (OS) missions were also pursuing intelligence operations, making
it impossible to merge them with the British.31 The committee also warned
that integration would prevent the partisans from knowing “that they are
receiving support and encouragement from the United States as a country.”32
Clark supported the OSS claims, as did U.S. Colonel John Riepe, who was in
charge of SpecialOperations at 15th ArmyGroup.Nothing further came of the
proposal.33 The British attempt to create at least a semblance of a Joint Planning
Committee at the 15th Army Group level was also rejected because “when
examined it revealed a well recognized pattern of integration with subsequent
control.” “Although [the] entire incident appears minor—as the officer in
charge of the 2677th Regiment commented—we believe it was [the] initial
step leading toward subordination of our SO work with [the] probable hope
that we would be involved in immediate post-combat political complications
in [the] area of occupation. We consider results at present satisfactory.”34
The lack of cooperation had negative consequences in at least two respects.
First, collecting information was often difficult, especially in the months after
the armistice when the situation in enemy-occupied Italy was far from clear.
Because each agency managed a completely independent network of agents
without coordination, it was impossible to crosscheck the information, a
situation exacerbated by the lack of a clear chain of command.
29. “OSS/SO and SOE Activities in Support of Italian Partisans,” 2 February 1945, in TNAUK, WO
204/11593.
30. Suhling, Rome, to Glavin, No. 235, 12 January 1944, in NARA, RG 226, Entry 190, Box 181,
Folder 1423; and “Memorandum for General George C. Marshall,” 15 December 1944, in NARA,
RG 226, Entry 210, Box 354.
31. Copy of this directive in AFHQ 1238, USAFIME 979, 2 March 1944, in NARA, RG 226, Entry
154, Box 59, Folder 978.
32. “Staff Study on Certain Phases of OSS Activities in Northern Italy,” 20 January 1945, in NARA,
RG 226, Entry 190, Box 91, Folder 41.
33. Glavin to Cheston, 6 March 1945, in NARA, RG 226, Entry 148, Box 112, Folder 1924.
34. Ibid.
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The situation was particularly thorny in Switzerland, where the initial
conflicting information was gathered by OSS and SOE. Although personal
relationships were friendly, John McCaffery, the head of SOE’s Italian sec-
tion, eschewed any sharing of information with his U.S. colleague, the future
CIA director Allen Dulles. In May 1944, after months of frustration, Dulles
reported that “in dealing with the delicate Maquis situation, a satisfactory
division of responsibility has never been decided upon between our organi-
zation and Zulu [McCaffery],” and then inquired what settlement had been
reached in southern Italy, hoping to replicate it in Switzerland.35 But because
no settlement had been reached in Italy, Dulles’s request went unanswered,
and the situation became more tangled. McCaffery kept refusing to agree to
a division of responsibilities, writing to his command that “since our work is
solely resistance and principally Italy and since we have complete organization
for work it seems to me that the duty of our American allies is to let us handle
that sector at least at any point where there is double contact.”36 The stalemate
was almost complete. When in July AFHQ complained about the lack of clear
information, Dulles explained to Washington:
Frankly feel your cable fails take account realities North Italian situation and fact
that partisan bands use every possible channel to signal their fields to [SOE] or us
and that only you and [SOE] can determine at your end what action to take. Also
my personal impression that until you and [SOE] can agree upon respective field
of operation chaos will continue. Feel gravely concerned, view Italian yearning
for American help, that this work seems to be more and more monopolized by
[SOE] and from discouraging reports given me yesterday as to actual droppings
on field signalled by us seems possible that [SOE] may be retained fields which
they have not yet opportunity to activate. Also remember that until [SOE] here
has some instructions about cooperating as to what we respectively send it is
difficult to effect proper coordination here.37
The problem of intelligence-gathering was not even partly resolved until the
summer, when the Allies started receiving reports directly from the agents who
had been dispatched to the partisans. In Switzerland the two organizations
continued to work independently.38
Second, the distribution of supplies immediately became a sore point
between the two agencies, as each tried to secure the bigger share for itself.
35. From Bern, No. 319–21, 20 March 1944, in NARA, RG 226, Entry 134, Box 166, Folder 1059.
36. Cipher telegram from Berne, No. 3483, 1 April 1944, in TNAUK, HS 6/782.
37. Telegram, 18 July 1944, in NARA, RG 226, Entry 190 C, Box 10, Folder 68.
38. On the OSS-SOE relations in Switzerland, see also Stafford, Mission Accomplished, pp. 92–106.
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The first serious clash erupted in the spring of 1944, when the AFHQ Special
Operations Section, after considering the distribution of the missions already
in the field, assigned two-thirds of the monthly supplies to SOE and one-third
to OSS. The military chiefs also tried to set up British and U.S. areas of
influence in Northern Italy, but OSS vigorously protested both directives. A
U.S. officer noted that “any[thing] other than a 50/50 split with No.1 Special
Force prejudices the American participation in this venture and prejudices
the Allied cause by seeming to recognize a primarily British interest in the
areas in question.”39 Moreover, the division into areas of influence would have
prevented OSS from sending agents into certain areas of northern Italy or
forced them to withdraw some who were already in place. Accordingly, AFHQ
decided that OSS and SOE would share equally in the monthly supply-drop
allocation, but the question of how supplies were allocated remained a point
of discord.40
On the one hand, U.S. officials went out of their way to claim that the
two allies were operating on completely equal footing and that any expectation
of a senior partnership by the British was against the spirit of the alliance. This
was particularly true during the first stages of the campaign when OSS still
lagged its British counterpart in missions, supplies, and facilities. For example,
when Donovan learned in June 1944 that McCaffery had told the Italians that
the British were sending most of the supplies, he immediately wrote a strong
letter to SOE Executive Chief Colin Gubbins:
If we undertake that kind of a campaign which seeks to show that one is delivering
a greater amount of supplies than the other I don’t know where we will end,
because it involves the question of the Americans having furnished the greater
percentage of the goods and also of the inability of OSS to obtain from your Air
Force equitable allocation of tonnage. I wish that [SOE in Switzerland] could be
made to see that it is advisable to avoid comparisons that it is good for neither
side to invoke. . . .You and I went through that experience in the Balkans and I
am sure you want no repetition of it any more than I do. We are making exactly
the same monetary contribution to this Group as your people are.41
Gubbins responded that he “entirely [agrees] with [him] that nothing should
interfere with [their] common interest in Italian affairs.”42
39. “1st Endorsement from C.O. Italy to C.O. Med,” 3 June 1944, in NARA, RG 226, Entry 190,
Box 101, Folder 202.
40. Smith, OSS, p. 91; and The Overseas Targets, p. 107.
41. Donovan to Gubbins, 23 August 1944, in TNAUK, HS 6/776.
42. Gubbins to Donovan, 2 September 1944, in TNAUK, HS 6/776.
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On the other hand, OSS moved actively to eclipse and overtake SOE,
aiming to let the Italians know that the United States was doing more than
Britain to help them. This is where the weight of U.S. resources played a
decisive role. As a U.S. officer wrote when discussing how to implement the
drops:
We feel that this matter is not merely one of maintaining resistance groups on a
basis to assist the armies from an actual combat standpoint, but what is evenmore
important, it will mean a great deal from the U.S. standpoint in the economic
and political field. Frankly, we view with a great deal of suspicion the attitude
of the British toward the Partisan groups. Regardless of whether our economic
and political aims are identical with the British or not, we will certainly not
accomplish our aims by allowing the British to put us in disfavour in the eyes of
the Italian population. We believe that if we can succeed in establishing contacts
for supplies as outlined above we will go far in keeping U.S. prestige with the
Partisans at least on fair level.43
According to a memorandum from Roseberry in June 1944, the British were
forced to accept the situation:
[The] Foreign office is not greatly concerned at increase of American prestige as
their aims do not clash with those of H.M.G. and their activities very much tied
up with home politics (the Italian vote could decide the presidential election.)
We must not attempt a race with OSS either in finance or deliveries. In the
former we would lose and we are only interested in supplying essential funds
for essential purposes. With regard to supplies allocation of aircraft is made by
commander in chief and we have so far received greater proportion.44
Roseberry suggested telling the Italians that there was no rivalry between the
British and OSS, that supporting the resistance was a joint undertaking, and
that any attempt to play one off against the other was useless.
The Italian Resistance and OSS/SOE
Coordination Problems
The military situation in northern Italy quickly changed in the summer of
1944, and the official history of the SOE avers that the Italian resistance
43. “Support of Partisan Activities,” 27 October 1944, in NARA, RG 226, Entry 190, Box 92, Folder
47. The OSS’s ability to provide a much bigger share of resources than the British could is stressed in
Stafford, Mission Accomplished, esp. pp. 34, 96–97.
44. Cipher telegram to Berne, No. 4892, 3 August 1944, in TNAUK, HS 6/776.
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movement “flowered very quickly in what had seemed to be a barren land.”45
After difficult months of organization, the bands that had survived the first
strong attacks by the Germans started engaging the enemy and spread partic-
ularly in Piedmont, behind the Apennine front and on the eastern border. On
20 July 1944, General Caffey asserted that “the resistance groups in Italy have
done quite a bit of demolition and have exceeded his [Caffey’s] expectations
in this matter.” The general added that he had doubted “their usefulness and
had been agreeably surprised.”46 OSS and SOE then began sending agents and
supplies on a regular basis.
In this new situation, the liaison structure set in the spring of 1944
between the two organizations proved to be dramatically inadequate. In the
field, the lack of coordination resulted in different missions working side by
side with different directives and agendas. Because of OSS’s attempt to gain
its independence and AFHQ’s inability to integrate the two agencies, the
coordination of missions was limited to exchanging information on the status
of Special Operation missions, and even this did not occur until the final
months of the war. Joint missions were refused by OSS, not only because
they would not have permitted the United States to pursue its own policy but
also because OSS had another consideration in mind: its agents were mostly
Italians recruited on the spot, and they would most likely be subordinate to
British officers in any joint missions.47 An official history of the campaign
compiled by SOE indicates that OSS “preferred rather to leave an area in
which a British Mission was working rather than to come to an agreement
with it for a division of responsibilities.”48
As a result, it happened frequently that a mission would reach the field
only to find that another mission was already working in the area.49 “To
anyone with experience of field conditions,” commented Lieutenant Colonel
McMullen, the SOE chief of mission in the Liguria region, “this spelt the most
dire confusion.”50 Not until the final months of the war did the two agencies
put the agents they dispatched to the same area in contact with one another.51
45. Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE, p. 546.
46. “Special Operations Meeting,” 20 June 1944, in NARA, RG 226, Entry 190, Box 88, Folder 5.
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When that did not happen, all conflicts and problems had to be sorted out by
the agents in the field.
The lack of coordination was sometimes risky for the agents. In March
1945, an OSS detachment sent three German deserters and partisans over the
lines to report on the front without warning the SOE mission operating in
the area. The three were immediately arrested as enemy spies and were nearly
shot.52
Acute problems also arose when British and U.S. agents pursued differ-
ent or opposite policies with the insurgents. These problems deepened the
divisions within the resistance movement and seriously eroded their military
efficiency. OSS tended to send agents to the strongest formations rather than
to unified commands of several groups. By contrast, SOE assigned agents
to a unified command “with the object of strengthening it and supporting
it in its task of coordination.”53 Furthermore, the missions often produced
different evaluations of the groups’ strength and supported rival groups, with
predictable results.
The conflicting management procedures of Italian personnel sent to the
field with the Allied missions were also a source of friction and misunderstand-
ing. Unlike the British, OSS lacked trained personnel and had to recruit mostly
Italian agents. Conforming to the general U.S. approach to political issues,
OSS tended not to consider the political affiliation of the agents, provided
that they obeyed orders.
Consequently, whereas an Italian agent enrolled by OSS recalled that he
had “always turned to the Communist Party and my comrades for support,”
another, stationed in the same area and enrolled by the same agency, stated that
“he was a ‘super-monarchist’ and would do everything in his power to secure
the continuation of the house of Savoy in Italy.”54 Typically, the information
sent by these agents reflected party propaganda. Sometimes Italian agents
conducted explicit anti-British propaganda. An SOE agent recounted: “Cesare
[an Italian agent] did nothing but divide the Partisans and the population in
two sides, pro-English or pro-American, never just pro-Allies.”55 When the
British protested the use of agents affiliated with the Communist Party, OSS
accused themof conducting a politically slanted policy and refused towithdraw
52. Major Davies to Major Macintosh, 19 March 1945, in TNAUK, HS 6/844.
53. “SOE Activity in Italy,” ch. XII.
54. “Napoli-Tigers,” in NARA, RG 226, Entry 210, Box 237; and “Report by Capt J. P. S. Amoore,”
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the agents.56 For the British, the situation became increasingly frustrating:
“The present divergence of policies between OSS and ourselves,” wrote John
Stevens, chief of the SOE mission in Piedmont, “is very disheartening, as it is
increasing an already difficult task of establishing order out of Partisan chaos.
It would be better if there were an American Officer in Piedmont controlling
their missions, but all OSS personnel appear to be Italian. It is exceedingly
irritating that equal weight is apparently given to Italians, all of whom are
party-bound, and to British personnel.”57
The competition over supply drops hindered cooperation even more, es-
pecially after U.S. officials succeeded in obtaining their own packing stations
and airfields to bypass the British channel.58 Thus, by the end of 1944 and
thereafter, OSS could ship large quantities of materiel, with no regard for either
SOE policy or the efficacy of transferring so many weapons to the partisans.
From December 1944 on, as Max Corvo predicted, OSS “would have over-
taken the SOE in all activities in Northern Italy” and British predominance
would have been ended “by the facts.”59 In February 1945, AFHQ decided
on a general reduction of military supplies for partisans in certain areas.60 The
new policy was dictated by a fear of overarming the partisans, which created a
dangerous situation toward the end of the war. This directive is what prompted
AFHQ to ask for better cooperation so that the two organizations could pursue
the same policy. But the 15th Army Group fought the directive, and OSS and
SOE also asked that it be reconsidered. While waiting for a new decision, OSS
kept sending supplies despite the limits imposed. Aware that this action di-
rectly contradicted the directives, the agency proceeded cautiously but forged
ahead anyway.61 The OSS Official War Report affirms:
In the spring of 1945, OSS had more clandestine radio circuits successfully in
operation and active liaisons with a greater number of effective resistance groups
than did its British intelligence and operations counterparts. In the last two
months of air supply, the OSS allotment was set higher than for the British,
and by VE-Day the total of American supplies, handled by the OSS packing
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station and successfully delivered inside Northern Italy, appreciably exceeded
corresponding SOE total.62
In March 1945, Major Gordon Lett, an SOE officer working with parti-
sans in the La Spezia region, reported that the already difficult situation with
the partisans “has been badly aggravated by the dropping of large quantities
of arms and equipment in the area to the OSS mission, which it was quite
impossible . . . for the British mission to control.”63 Similar reports came in
from all across the front. Another agent from the same area, noting the anti-
British sentiment among the partisans, wrote that “the root cause of this was
undoubtedly the arrival of the vastly superior quantity and quality of American
supplies, compared with the meager trickle that reached the patriots through
the British Mission.”64
The partisans generally interpreted this discrepancy in political terms,
blaming the British for attempting to prevent the expansion of the Italian
resistance movement. As a British agent reported, “to outward appearances we
were playing to perfection the part of the perfidious Albion.”65 Another agent,
this time from Piedmont, reported: “As far as supplies go, the general feeling
was that the Americans had done more, partly because [they were] richer
but also because [they were] more sympathetic. In some quarters, the view
was that they probably would have done better still if it had not been for the
British.”66 Italian historians, especially those writing before the first British and
U.S. records became available, have generally supported this vision, playing up
the supposed difference between a progressive U.S. policy and a conservative
British one.
The competition between the two agencies also played a role in the
relationship with the CLNAI. In this case, OSS was trying to gain a foothold
in a group that until then had been managed by the British. Both Dulles and
McCaffery had communicated to their respective superiors that the CLNAI
preferred to work with them, an indication that the Italians were playing one
agency against the other to maximize support.67 Certainly, U.S. officials were
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the first to provide them with significant financial support. The British were
then forced to allocate a similar amount, even if they would have preferred
to involve the Italian government in the matter. The London headquarters
instructed McCaffery to give the money and to “avoid every reference to
apparent competition with OSS [and] merely stress that the needs of CLNAI
are desperate.”68
In July 1944, SOE supported an operation in northern Italy led by Italian
General Raffaele Cadorna, who was supposed to be appointed the military
commander of the CLNAI. Max Corvo, a senior official in the OSS SI branch,
wrote that “by sending to northern Italy a general who is very popular with
the democratic forces, SOE hopes to obtain complete control of the northern
Italian situation.”69 As a countermeasure, a mission led by a U.S. officer was
organized and sent to establish contact with the CLNAI. A similar situation
occurred a few months later when SOE organized a trip to southern Italy
by four CLNAI delegates to discuss an agreement with AFHQ. OSS officials
thought that “SOE has been negotiating with CLN to the exclusion of our
interest and investment both in personnel and finance,” and they asked to
participate in all meetings with the delegates.70 Vincent Scamporino, one of
the SI branch chiefs, welcomed them with a salute to compatriots: “I know
that the British do a lot for you, but from us Americans you will have all
what they gave you and always something more; and that’s because we Italian-
Americans have your blood in our veins.”71 Yet the U.S. maneuvers were
unsuccessful. With the 1944 agreement between the Italians and the Allies,
the British achieved the most significant landmarks in their relationship with
the CLNAI.72
Conclusion
The relatively simple political situation in which the Allies were operating
in Italy was the only thing that prevented the unsatisfactory arrangements
established by OSS and SOE from causing greater problems. In the Balkans
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the British had maintained the lead in special operations. When civil war
broke out in Yugoslavia, they were able to impose their policy of supporting
Tito’s Communist groups. OSS’s attempt to reverse this approach failed. Even
though U.S. officials bitterly criticized the British stance toward Yugoslavia
during and after the war, SOE was able to continue pursuing it until May
1945.
No serious clashes occurred between the different groups in Italy, and the
Allies did not need to make difficult choices about which groups to support.
Both OSS and SOE agreed that all anti-Nazi partisans should be supported
and that they would not be at risk of a confrontation with the legitimate
government. Even though on several occasions British and U.S. agents in the
field adopted different policies or supported rival groups, this did not directly
affect the political setup of the Italian resistance movements.
Nevertheless, the competition between OSS and SOE in Italy took a
heavy toll on military effectiveness. The agents went to the field without
any coordination, causing misunderstandings and an overlapping of missions.
Sometimes missions or supply drops were dispatched by OSS without regard
for theirmilitary effectiveness andwith the sole aim of gaining an edge on SOE.
The extensive use by OSS of Italian agents with strong political affiliations had
a negative impact on support to the Italian resistance and onOSS’s relationship
with the British. The competition diminished the Allies’ standing in the eyes of
the partisans and contributed to anti-Allied feelings that intensified in postwar
Italy.
Whatever the problems, the Italian campaign put an end to the British
attempt to maintain the U.S. agency at a subordinate level. OSS not only
managed to operate completely independently but also eventually overtook
the British in missions and supplies sent to the field. This development was
paralleled in the growing preponderance of the United States in the Anglo-
American alliance, which led in turn to a shift of strategy with the opening of
a second front in France and the end of Churchill’s Mediterranean focus. For
better or for worse, a new era in intelligence history had begun.
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